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FPC 010-84

## INTELLIGENCE PRODUCERS COUNCIL

24 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Minutes of 5 January 1984 Meeting on NITs

1. [redacted] of the IPC Staff chaired the 5 January meeting and opened the session by reminding attendees (see Attachment A for list of attendees) that the meeting had been scheduled at the request of the Director of Intelligence Programs, NSC Staff, to discuss their concerns about the Intelligence Community's responsiveness to National Intelligence Topics (NITs) relating to international terrorism (NIT #28) and to foreign leaders and factions (NITs #30 and #31). He noted that his request was made following an NSC Staff review of a summary listing of Community products and/or projects identified by intelligence producers as being fully or partially responsive to those NITs of concern. The listing had been provided to them by the IPC Staff and was based on inputs from DIA, CIA, State/INR, and the National Intelligence Council (NIC). [redacted]

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Views on the NIT Process

2. Helene Boatner, Chief, Product Evaluation Staff, Directorate of Intelligence (DI), CIA, opened the discussion period by describing the DI production planning process and the use of NITs in developing a production plan. She indicated the process seeks to reflect the concerns of consumers as well as to address recognized policy issues. It also consciously attempts to reflect and respond to NITs. She illustrated the latter point by stating that one of the "cross-cutting" themes in the 1984 DI research program focused on terrorism which is the subject of NIT #28. When the plan is responsive to a NIT, the subject topic number is cited in the published production plan. Helene emphasized, however, that the production plan, which is coordinated within the Community and by consumers, accounts for between 40 and 60 percent of the Directorate's research and production while the balance of the analytic effort is devoted to current intelligence and ad hoc reporting. Reporting in the latter categories may be responsive to particular NITs but is not reflected in the research plan. [redacted]

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3. Following Helene Boatner's remarks, Ken deGraffenreid, Director of Intelligence Programs, NSC Staff, briefed the group on his Staff responsibilities, his perspective of the NITs, and the whole process of how intelligence is requested and used by the policymakers. Ken indicated that research of consumers over the past six or seven years indicate considerable dissatisfaction with available products, and that we are here to do what we can to improve the producer-consumer relationship. He noted that his mission is to support the President and the NSC advisors by seeing to it that the best possible intelligence, both current and long range, is brought to bear on policy issues of

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concern to the NSC. As such, he and the Staff view the NITs as a vehicle established by the DCI that permits them to express their intelligence needs and to impact on the Community's research and analyses. Given that view, Ken and Roy Godson, consultant to the NSC Staff, have spent a great amount of time getting the regional and functional experts on the Staff to identify their special intelligence needs and then translating these needs into NIT questions that directly correlate to the interests of those experts. Ken indicated that the NSC Staff is concerned that their sincere efforts to identify and communicate issues of priority concern to the Community are not having the desired impact in terms of the production of responsive products.

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### Discussion of Specific NITs

4. Before discussing the individual NITs, Ken deGraffenreid indicated that his review of the listing of Community products and projects provided by the IPC Staff suggested that the Community's responses to NITs #28, #30, and #31 were generally not well focused and, even when appropriate, would not be received in time to be of value to the NSC Staff. Roy Godson concurred with Ken's statement and, subsequently provided some examples of scheduled products being too late to be of value. In the subsequent discussions, Roy also observed that editing of the NITs had shifted the focus of some of the questions submitted by the NSC Staff.

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5. NIT #28 (International Terrorism). Ken deGraffenreid opened the discussion on this topic by indicating that the NSC Staff viewed terrorism as a broad, complex problem that was difficult to cope with from the policymaker's perspective. The NSC Staff's primary interest in this topic sponsored by DOE and Treasury is the question of what specific terrorist groups—to include their nature and sponsorship—are targeted against US interests. Ken emphasized that timely answers to these questions are required. Roy Godson pointed out the importance of timeliness by referring to the topic (NIT #28.b(4)) on the probability of terrorist actions at the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, and noted that the product from a scheduled project addressing that subject would be too late to be of use to the NSC Staff. (A CIA representative noted that a typescript memo summarizing the essential information on the subject will be prepared and disseminated well before the beginning of the games.) Representatives from the CIA and DIA responded by describing the difficulty of getting specific information on terrorist threats, particularly timely data that can be used to accurately forecast an event before it happens. Because of the timeliness factor, Community representatives pointed out that the NITs are not an appropriate mechanism for requesting fast responses nor is the production plan an accurate gauge of Community reporting on specific NITs. The President's Daily Brief, DIA's Weekly Presidential Book, State/INR's Morning and Afternoon Summaries, and typescript memos which do not appear in the production plan were cited as vehicles frequently used to report on specific terrorist threats. In response to a question from Roy Godson on whether the CIA/DI production plan has a scheduled project that answers the NIT, Helene Boatner stated that there were some add-ons to the plan which are not included on the list reviewed by the NSC Staff that meet some of the information requirements. She also responded to another query from Roy Godson concerning the status of DI exploratory projects. She stated that such projects would be worked on but might not be completed because of resource constraints, data problems, and competing demands. Helene also mentioned that consumers are encouraged to provide feedback to the DI Product Evaluation Staff particularly if they believe that scheduled or exploratory projects in the production plan should be changed or upgraded in priority. Ken deGraffenreid closed out the discussion on this topic by pointing out that the NSC Staff realized there were other avenues for tasking and getting responses from the Community but, had been asked by the DCI to use the NITs as their vehicle for providing a one-year focus on the problem.

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7. The ensuing discussion focused on the utility of the NIT as a tasking mechanism and the need for direct tasking if the NSC Staff expects to get products tailored to their specific needs. Community representatives in attendance emphasized that the NITs of concern contain questions that are broad and too general to enable producers to take such guidance and provide the NSC Staff with the specific responses that are needed. The representatives also indicated that producers are more responsive to direct tasking, particularly when the tasking is well-focused. Ken deGraffenreid responded by stating that the NITs are the vehicle the DCI has provided them to interact with intelligence producers. A number of participants stated that the format for the NITs may contribute to the lack of specificity in guidance provided in the NITs document. The chairman ended the discussion on these topics by indicating that there was obviously a difference in views regarding the intent (i.e., specific tasking or general guidance) of the NITs and pointed out that, at least from his perspective, the best way to get the tailored product required is to task the producers directly (e.g., NIOs, production managers in each agency) [redacted]

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#### Closing Remarks

8. In closing, the chairman indicated that the IPC Staff would publish and disseminate the minutes of the meeting to the attendees. With regard to the NITs, he asked for suggestions on ways to enhance the Community's responsiveness to and contacts with the NSC Staff. Ken deGraffenreid also invited more feedback from the producers on the NITs of concern to the NSC Staff.

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IPC Staff

Attachment:  
as stated


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ATTACHMENT A

## ATTENDEES AT 5 JANUARY 1984 MEETING ON NITS

Name

Ken deGraffenreid  
Roy Godson



Organization

NSC Staff (Director of Intelligence Programs)  
NSC Staff (Staff Consultant)

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DIA/VP-A1 (Special Actions Division)  
DIA/DB-1 (Soviet Warsaw Pact Division)  
DIA/OS-IB (Country Terrorist Threat Branch)  
DIA/DB-1 (Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division)  
DIA/DB-3 (Western Division)  
DIA/DB-3 (Western Division)  
DIA/DB-1 (Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division)  
DIA/DC (Collection Division)  
DIA/DB-3 (Western Division, Latin American Branch)

## Helene Boatner



CIA/DDI (Product Evaluation Staff)  
CIA/DDI (Office of Global Issues, Terrorism Branch)  
CIA/DDI (Office of Soviet Analysis)  
CIA/DDI (Office of Global Issues, Instability and Insurgency Center)  
CIA/DDI (Office of European Analysis)  
CIA/DDI (Office of Near East, South Asia Analysis)  
CIA/DDI (Office of East Asian Analysis)  
CIA/DDI (Office of Central Reference)

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Isabel Johnstone  
E. Raymond Platig


State/INR (Office of Global Issues)  
State/INR (Office of Long-Range Assessments and Research)

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IPC Staff (NSA Representative)  
IPC Staff (DIA Representative)  
IPC Staff (CIA Representative)

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